

Russian popular attitudes towards Putin's war on Ukraine as viewed through the prism of Russian national culture

Fred Hoffman

Associate Professor, Mercyhurst University, USA

fhoffman@mercyhurst.edu

Abstract

This article, a conceptual explanatory analysis, examines why the Russian people and Americans have such diametrically opposed views of Russian President Vladimir Putin's leadership and Russia's war on Ukraine. After Russia invaded Ukraine on 24 February 2022, Vladimir Putin's popularity within Russia did not decline, and more than four years later it still remains surprisingly high. Outside Russia, various explanations have been offered to explain persistent domestic popular support for Putin: It's just Kremlin propaganda. Russians are simply rallying 'round the flag. Russian public opinion polls are not reliable. Russian citizens oppose the war but fear harsh consequences for challenging the Kremlin's position. Another possible explanation for Russian popular attitudes towards Putin and the war in Ukraine is Russian national culture. The analytical prism of Hofstede's Six Dimensions of National Culture not only reveals significant differences between Russian and U.S. national cultures across all six dimensions that not only help explain Russian attitudes and behavior, it also helps explain the inability of Americans and other Westerners to comprehend why so many citizens in the Russian Federation seemingly continue to support President Putin and also Russia's war on Ukraine.

Keywords: Russia, Ukraine, national culture, perception, Hofstede

INTRODUCTION

With the exception of one four-year term (2008-2012) when he switched roles with former Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev, Vladimir Putin has continuously served as President of the Russian Federation since he was first elected in 2000, more than a quarter century ago. In that time, the fledgling Russian democracy that struggled to emerge from the ashes of communism under Putin's predecessor, former President Boris Yeltsin, slowly but steadily devolved into a repressive autocracy (Snegovaya, 2023). In 2014, taking advantage of political turmoil in neighboring Ukraine, Russia militarily seized and annexed Crimea (Galeotti, 2023) and launched a not-so-covert war in Donbas to seize control of Ukraine's industrial heartland (Riehle, 2024). Then, on the early morning of 24 February 2022, Vladimir Putin announced on Russian TV a "special military operation" (SVO) to "demilitarize and denazify" Ukraine and protect citizens in the Donbas region (Russia's Putin, 2022, para 1). Instead of lasting the projected three days, though, Putin's SVO has now dragged on for more than four years, cost over a million Russian casualties (Eckel, 2026), has severely damaged a Russian economy (Jones & McCabe,

2026) that was already under strain from Western economic sanctions (Hosoe, 2023). Despite all these setbacks, surveys revealed that Russian President Vladimir Putin's public approval rating in mid-2026 remained between 65% and 79% (Do you approve, 2026).

Putin's sustained degree of public approval in Russia mystifies observers living outside Russia (Volkov, 2015; Frye et al., 2017). A number of explanations have been put forward to explain this phenomenon: Russian survey respondents are simply victims of Kremlin propaganda. Russians are subject to the "rally 'round the flag" syndrome. Russian opinion polls cannot be trusted. Russian citizens actually oppose the war but fear the substantial legal consequences of publicly disagreeing with their government.

Alternative explanations for Russian popular support for Putin and the war in Ukraine

The effectiveness of Kremlin propaganda

During the Boris Yeltsin years (1991-1999), and in stark contrast to previous Soviet times, Russian print and TV news enjoyed unprecedented freedom; powerful Russian oligarchs like Boris Berezovsky and Sergey Guriyev operated media outlets that were well-known for routinely thumbing the Russian government in the eye (Dawisha, 2015). The accidental sinking of the Russian submarine *Kursk* on 12 August 2000, shortly after the start of Putin's first term as president, prompted scathing Russian media reporting about the failure of both President Putin and the Russian government to adequately respond to the incident (Dawisha, 2015). This critical media coverage did not sit well at all with Vladimir Putin, who regarded media coverage criticizing him over the Kursk sinking and the conflict in Chechnya as "unpatriotic" (Burrett, 2020, p. 197). Since Putin's first term as president (2000-2004), the Russian government has systematically tightened its control over the Russian news media (Dawisha, 2015). This control has proven critical to enable more effective Kremlin propaganda, because propaganda enables a government "to control the interpretation of political events" (Boyte, 2017, p. 88).

The 2018 World Values Survey revealed that fully 63% of Russians get their news from Russian TV (Javakhishvili, 2020). Reliance on TV news is especially the case for older Russians (Kizilova & Norris, 2022b). By taking control of Russian media, the Kremlin became able to not only message the Russian population but also ensure that no one had the means to effectively challenge those messages. "Instead of relying on fear and brutal repression, modern autocrats use repression more surgically and prefer to censor media and broadcast propaganda to shape public opinion" (Sharafutdinova, 2020, p. 1). Age is a relevant variable for assessing popular attitudes toward the war for yet another reason. After the Russian government announced conscription in the fall of 2022, the number of survey respondents over the age of 45 who approved of Putin's decision to go to war dropped slightly to 76%, while those in the 18 to 45 age bracket (all ages subject to conscription) dropped to 40% (Rustamova & Tovkaylo, 2022). "Another interesting nuance is that, among younger people, there has been a sharp increase" in the number of respondents who select "unsure" as an answer to a question, which "might be a way to avoid answering the question" (Rustamova & Tovkaylo, 2022).

Riehle (2022) identified the following six consistent propaganda themes in Putin's Russia:

1. "Russia is a victim of a concerted, U.S.-led, anti-Russia campaign."
2. "Ukraine is a fascist, corrupt state."
3. "The United States creates instability in the world."

4. Russia saved the world by defeating Hitler in World War II, and “any action that diminishes that is ‘Russophobia.’”
5. “NATO is a threat to international security.”
6. “The European Union is on the verge of collapse” (p. 64).

In addition to news media, rituals and symbolism have also been an integral part of Russia’s domestic propaganda. The annual 9 May “Victory Day” celebrations, which originated in Soviet times, became an increasingly important component of the Kremlin’s domestic propaganda contributing to “social solidarity” (Linchenko & Golovashina, 2019, p. 63.) Parents and school-aged children alike dressing in World War II uniforms and marching in parades “is an important element in the conduct of patriotic actions that are not related to the celebration of the victory over Germany” (Linchenko & Golovashina, 2019, p. 69). Similarly, Putin’s rehabilitation of Josef Stalin in his role as the Soviet Union’s leader during the Second World War should also be considered in this context. “Similar to Stalinism, Putin’s tenure of Russian leadership since 2000 offers the Russian populace access to a cause more significant than the individual, but without the flawed and failed political doctrine and ideology” (Pagen, 2020, p. 74-75). As Chernobrov and Briant (2020) observed, “Metaphors create feelings and emotions” (p. 8). Rather than causing viewers to *think* about what they’re hearing and seeing, propaganda causes viewers to react on an *emotional* level. As Greene (2022) observed, “in comparative politics, emotions are increasingly recognized as central to phenomena ranging from violence and ethnic conflict to protest cascades” (p. 2). The Kremlin’s habit of calling Ukrainians “Nazis”, for example, thoroughly mystifies Westerners; however, this appellation makes far more sense when understood as a propaganda ploy intended to evoke an emotional response among Russians, for whom the Second World War remains not only a catastrophic tragedy, but also a symbol of monumental national revival (Kuzio, 2022).

The effectiveness of Kremlin propaganda does not seem adequate to explain all on its own strong popular support for Putin as demonstrated by opinion poll results, because “those same forces have for years sought to convince Russians of the value of the Russian anti-COVID vaccine, Sputnik. Yet resistance to that message has been extensive” (Mueller, 2022, p. 30).

“Rally ‘round the flag’ syndrome

“Rally ‘round the flag’ refers to *temporary* spikes in popularity for national leaders in the wake of a national tragedy or other significant event (Baker & Oneal, 2001; Frey et al., 2017). On the grounds that the spike was not short-term, but rather lasted for four years, Sharafutdinova (2022) disputes the assertion by Greene and Robertson (2014) and others that the “rally ‘round the flag’ effect explains the surge in Putin’s popularity after the 2014 seizure of Crimea.

The questionable veracity of Russian public opinion polls

Throughout 2022, Russian government-controlled polling firms (such as WCIOM and FOM) have consistently asserted that a clear majority of Russians approve of President Putin’s actions in Ukraine (Rustamova & Tovkaylo, 2022; Khvostunova, 2022; Kizilova, K., & Norris, 2022b). In contrast to Russian government polling organizations, the Yuri Levada Analytical Center, a private public opinion firm, is generally considered “Russia’s most reputable social research firm” (Buckley et al., 2022). Originally founded in 1987, the Levada Center began conducting public opinion surveys in 1988

(Bowman, 2022). Its reputation for fairness is reflected by the fact that, in 2016, the Russian Ministry of Justice designated the Levada Center a foreign agent (Vachedin, 2017). In mid-2022, Russia's Levada Center conducted a public opinion poll that found public support for Putin had actually *increased* from 71 percent prior to the start of the war on 24 February to 83 percent in late March ("Poll shows", 2022). Those findings aligned with those of Russian government-backed pollsters, who also found an approval rating for Putin that was over 80 percent ("Poll shows", 2022). The jump in support for Putin should not be surprising: In 1999, 75 percent of Russians had expressed support for Putin's military actions in Chechnya at that time, while *The Washington Post* reported that 91 percent supported his annexation of Crimea in 2014 (Parker, 2022). In early 2014, a Levada Center poll similarly showed the spike in approval rates for Putin in the wake of Crimea's seizure and subsequent annexation (Parker, 2022). Denis Volkov, Director of the Levada Center, understands how challenging it is to determine what Russians actually think. Levada conducts its polls face-to-face, and survey participants are assured of anonymity. Despite these assurances, Volkov said, surveys reveal more about what people are prepared to say publicly than how they actually feel (Treisman, 2022).

Washington Post researchers conducted an experiment to test the relationship between popular *perceptions* of Putin's popularity and his *actual* popularity. What they found was that when survey respondents were told that Putin's approval was low and dropping, respondents' support for Putin dropped by six to 11 percentage points (Buckley et al., 2022). "These findings suggest that much of Putin's support is based on *perceptions* that he is popular. Without that perception, Putin's popularity fades" (Buckley et al., 2022).

Two other explanations may also partly explain consistently pro-Putin poll results: *Self-censorship*, and *response bias*. Self-censorship refers to popular fears that their poll responses may be reported to the government (Javakhishvili, 2020). Response bias is where survey respondents are reluctant to express their true opinions for fear of social sanction (Kizilova, K., & Norris, 2022b).

Popular unwillingness to publicly challenge the Kremlin narrative

In March 2022, shortly after the Russian invasion of Ukraine began, Putin signed a fake news law that imposed severe penalties on those who contradict the government's position on the war (Parker, 2022). "Merely describing the war as such could lead to a 15-year jail sentence, posing obvious challenges for those seeking to conduct accurate polls there" (Parker, 2022). Skepticism among prospective survey respondents is not without merit: A Russian government pollster contacted a professor in Moscow by phone, asking if she would be willing to participate in a public opinion poll, and said that her phone number would be noted for quality control (Yaffa, 2022). Senior Russian government officials, including President Putin, publicly referred to citizens critical of the "special military operation" as "traitors" (Russia: Arrests, 2022). Aware that the consequences for saying anything that conflicted with the government's position on the war could create problems for them, many Russians either decline to participate in polls or say whatever they think the pollster (and the Russian government) wants to hear.

Once Russia's "special military operation" began on 24 February 2022, the Russian government moved quickly to demonstrate its absolute intolerance of dissent. Soon after Russia invaded Ukraine, "tens of thousands" of Russians protested publicly against the war, and "over 15,000" were detained by Russian authorities since 24 February 2022 (Khvostunova, 2022). Even Russians who protested by simply holding up blank pieces of paper on the street have been arrested (Schreck, 2022). After conducting a series of independent experiments in Russia to determine the validity of Putin's high public approval

numbers, Frye et al. (2017) declared, “We conclude that Putin’s approval ratings largely reflect the attitudes of Russian citizens” (p. 1).

While each of these aforementioned explanations may have some validity, another possible explanation worthy of consideration is *differences in national culture*. Hofstede et al. (2010) described culture as “the collective programming of the mind which distinguishes the members of one human group from another” (p. 21), and asserted that culture can exist within nations, organizations, professions, and families. Members of a culture share symbols, heroes, ritual, and values, which Hofstede et al. (2010) described as the “four manifestations of culture” (p. 7). One of the most commonly-used tools to assess the dominant culture within a nation – its *national culture* – was originally developed by Hofstede (1980), and ultimately evolved into the Six Dimensions of National Culture (Hofstede et al., 2010).

METHODOLOGY

This article employs a theory-driven interpretive analysis, based on Hofstede et al.’s (2010) national cultural framework, to better understand Russian popular support for Vladimir Putin and for Russia’s ongoing war in Ukraine. This study used a qualitative methodology, an explanatory case study, to analyze and compare U.S. and Russian national cultures to gain insight into some of the reasons why Americans and Russians feel so differently about Vladimir Putin’s leadership style and about Russia’s ongoing war in Ukraine. Open-source intelligence (OSINT) techniques were used to identify and collect Russian government policies and statements by Vladimir Putin and other prominent Russian leaders to assess whether those statements were, in fact, consistent with Hofstede’s assertions about the nature of Russian national culture.

A Comparison of U.S. and Russian national culture based on Hofstede’s 6DNC




Figure 1. Russian versus American index scores according to Hofstede's Six Dimensions of National Culture. Author generated, based on Hofstede et al. (2010).

As depicted in Figure 1 (above), Russia and U.S. national cultures differ significantly across all six of Hofstede et al.'s (2010) six dimensions. Hofstede Insights (2022) asserts that, due to a fairly low Power Distance score (40) and a high Individualist score (91), some common characteristics of American national culture are individualism, “liberty and justice for all”, an “explicit emphasis on equal rights in all aspects of American society and government”, and the acceptance of new ideas. By contrast, Russia’s high Power Distance score (93) and high Collectivist score (91) results in Russian citizens having rather different cultural attributes. “Both the Russian elite’s and laypeople’s embrace of a historically bound identity has often been associated with the tenets of toughness, resiliency, collectivism, stability, realism, and paternalism” (Pagen, 2020, p. 66).

Power Distance (PDI)

Not all individuals in a society are equal. Hofstede et al.'s (2010) Power Distance (PDI) dimension describes the attitude of cultural members towards dependence relationships in a country, or the degree to which members of the cultural group tolerate inequality and unequal power distribution (Hofstede Insights, 2022). Hofstede (2013) said, “Power Distance is defined as the extent to which the less powerful members of institutions and organizations with a society expect and accept that power is distributed unequally” (p. 7). Countries with a higher PDI score (like Russia, 93) tend to be more authoritarian, while countries with a lower PDI score (like the U.S., 40) tend to be more egalitarian.

In high power distance cultures, “inequality is seen as the basis of societal order” (Hofstede et al., 2010, p. 97). Russia has an extremely high score on the Power Distance Index (PDI), meaning Russian society expects and accepts a hierarchical distribution of power, and inequalities within the system are viewed as essential for maintaining order. Given their history, Russians prefer a strong, sober leader who sits atop the hierarchy to maintain order and resolve issues unilaterally (Hale, 2011).

Individuals from a higher Power Distance culture are more likely to accept authority, and do what their superiors tell them to do, than would be their counterparts in a lower power distance culture (Hofstede et al., 2010). Attitudes toward leadership also vary from one national culture to another. “Readers in many Western nations might be surprised to learn that the extremely positive connotation associated with the word ‘leadership’ is not universal, and some societies have a very skeptical view of leaders and




Figure 2. Hofstede's Power Distance Index scores for the U.S. and Russia. Adapted from Hofstede et al. (2010).

leadership” (House et al., 2004, p. 1). Individuals from a higher Power Distance culture are less likely to challenge or confront authority figures in their organization (Hofstede et al., 2010).

The Hofstede et al. (2010) research team determined that Russia has a High Power Distance culture, earning a 93 on a 0-to-100-point scale. In fact, Russia earned the sixth highest score of 76 countries and regions Hofstede et al. (2010) studied throughout the world. Not only Hofstede et al. (2010), but also Grachev and Bobina (2006), who analyzed results for Russia obtained by the Global Leadership and Organizational Behavior Effectiveness (GLOBE) research program, found Russian respondents scored “very high in Power Distance” (p. 74).

One of the attributes of a High Power Distance culture is popular acceptance of the power and prestige associated with one’s position and status. Not only political leaders, but also bosses, older family members, coaches, and doctors receive greater deference than in a lower power distance culture (Hofstede et al., 2010). Consistent with Russia’s high PDI score, Russians are distrustful of politics and politicians, in part as a result of their experiences in Soviet times, again in the 1990s, and more recently due to clear messaging from the Putin regime that popular dissent will not be tolerated (Dollbaum et al., 2021).

Putin himself has explicitly normalized the need for a “strong state” as the primary driver of the nation, aligning with the High Power Distance belief that power should be concentrated and hierarchical: “The key to Russia's recovery and growth today lies in the state-political sphere. Russia needs strong state power and must have it” (Russia between, 2025).

Individualism-Collectivism (IDV)

The individualism index (IDV) concerns the role (and importance) of the individual compared to the group (Hofstede et al., 2010). Hofstede’s 100-point scale ranks national cultures with lower scores as *collectivist*, and higher scores as *individualist*. In highly individualist countries, each individual is responsible for his own destiny; by contrast, in countries at the collectivist end of the spectrum, an individual belongs to a group, and takes the welfare of the group into consideration when making decisions (Hofstede et al., 2010). Hofstede (2013) described this dimension of national culture as follows:



Figure 3. Hofstede's Individualism versus Collectivism Index scores for the U.S. and Russia. Adapted from Hofstede et al. (2010).

Individualism is the opposite of Collectivism. Individualism stands for a society in which the ties between individuals are loose: a person is expected to look after himself or herself and his or her immediate family only. Collectivism stands for a society in which people from birth onwards are integrated into strong, cohesive in-groups, which continue to protect them throughout their lifetime in exchange for unquestioning loyalty (p. 7).

According to Hofstede et al. (2010), the U.S. is a more individualist society, and Russia a more collectivist one. In fact, Hofstede et al. (2010) found that Russia scored “considerably more collectivist than do Western countries” (p. 125). Humphrey (2001) observed that, “In Russia over the long term the basic building blocks of the polity have not been individuals but territorially rooted and internally hierarchical groups, and *individuals have social meaning in terms of those groups*” (p. 334).

Whereas Americans socialized in an individualist culture take pride in rugged individualism and the freedom of personal choice, Russians socialized in a collectivist culture assign far greater importance to conforming to group norms and following the rules. In his first speech after becoming President in 2000, Vladimir Putin spoke of “ensuring the unity of Russian society”, arguing that “fruitful and creative work...is impossible in a split and internally disintegrated society” (Humphrey, 2001). In that same speech, Putin identified what he described as the “four footholds” of Russian society: “Patriotism, belief in the greatness of Russia, statism, and social solidarity” (Humphrey, 2001, p. 335). In quarter century

since that speech, Putin and his regime have made abundantly clear to the Russian people what “social solidarity” means: *Conform to group norms. Follow the rules.*

On 11 June 2013, during a televised visit to the Moscow headquarters of Russia’s state-funded TV network RT, Putin declared, “The American mentality is based on individualism, as in *Gone with the Wind*, where Scarlett couldn’t imagine starving. The Russian mentality is based on collectivism. Understanding each other is quite difficult, but possible” (Kurpyaeva, O., and Latukhina, 2013, para 2). Putin has openly praised this dynamic, declaring collectivism to be one of the distinct advantages of the Russian people, and has enshrined it as a core “spiritual and moral value” in the Foundational Policy Decree (On approval, 2022). Ordinary young people are taught about Russian “collectivism” and hostile Western “individualism” in the college course *Foundations of Russian Statehood*, which is now compulsory for all first-year students (Kortukov & Waller, 2024). Vladimir Putin’s statements emphasizing the supremacy of the collective over the individual, a strict societal hierarchy led by a strong central state, and the preservation of traditional moral values align with the attributes of Russian national culture identified by Hofstede et al. (2010). “The main commissioner of the project of collectivist transformation of Russian society is Putin himself” (Pertsev, 2024).

Masculinity-Femininity (MAS)

According to Hofstede et al. (2010), the Masculinity-Femininity dimension assesses a cultural group’s attitude toward work-related goals. In this dimension, Hofstede et al. (2010) differentiated between societies based on traits normally associated with male or female gender roles:

A society is considered masculine when emotional gender roles are clearly distinct: men are supposed to be assertive, tough, and focused on material success, whereas women are supposed to be more modest, tender, and concerned with the quality of life. A society is called feminine when emotional gender roles

overlap: both men and women are supposed to be modest, tender, and concerned with the quality of life” (Hofstede et al., 2010, p. 140).



Figure 4. Hofstede's Individualism versus Collectivism Index scores for the U.S. and Russia. Adapted from Hofstede et al. (2010).

Since Russia scores high on power distance, it may seem counter-intuitive that its score on the masculinity-femininity dimension designates Russia as a *feminine* culture. Upon closer inspection, though, the PDI and MAS scores for Russian national culture are not incompatible. Wolf and Stankovic (2015) explained the interaction between Russia’s high power distance score and feminine culture as follows: While high power distance accounts for Russia’s “autocratic management style,” Russia’s feminine culture results in company owners playing “a paternalistic role”, with the owner being “the most influential (powerful) person in the organization” (p. 12). Among Russians, “Authoritarian leadership is expected and well-accepted” (Wolf and Stankovic, 2015, p. 13). Authoritarian paternalism comes at the price of conformity, with severe consequences for those who challenge it. Three examples illustrate this point. In July 2000, Putin met with Russian oligarchs and laid out new “ground rules” under which Putin would allow the oligarchs to continue to enrich themselves, and in exchange they would stay out of politics (Gaddy & Ickes, 2009, p. 49). When oligarch Mikhail Khodorkovsky deviated from those ground rules, and attempted to challenge Putin in the political realm, Putin had him arrested, imprisoned for a decade, and through Russian courts stripped him of his considerable wealth (Gaddy & Ickes, 2009). “Since then, no one else has challenged Putin’s deal” (Gaddy & Ickes, 2009, p. 50). Similarly, the way Putin dealt with Alexei Navalny was also consistent with autocratic leadership in a high power distance culture, from never mentioning Navalny by name (Eidelman, 2013), to Russian government agents allegedly attempting to kill Navalny (Dollbaum et al., 2021), and Putin’s refusal to even guarantee that Navalny would ever get out of prison alive (Etkind, 2021). Maria Alyokhina and Nadezhda Tolokonnikova, political activists and members of the Russian counter-culture rock group *Pussy Riot*, similarly earned the wrath of Russian authorities because they openly criticized Russian popular acceptance of repressive authority “in exchange for status, financial perks, and peace of mind” (Dzero and Bystrova, 2017, p. 270). In 2021, Alyokhina was arrested six times for participation in anti-government protests; in May of 2022, while still under house arrest, Alyokhina engineered her escape from Russia to the West (Bouza, 2022).

One aspect of Hofstede et al.’s (2010) MAS dimension scores for the U.S. and Russia seems counter-intuitive: Although the U.S. scores as a masculine culture, it is not uncommon for women to hold

leadership positions in the government, commercial sector, or academia (Lyness & Grotto, 2018). By contrast, in Russia, a feminist culture, Russian men and women would both rather work for a man than a woman; “few women believe they can or should aspire to positions of leadership, and few women hold such positions” (Dzero & Bystrova, 2017, p. 272).

In a televised 10 June 2025 meeting with his Security Council “on improving the state policy of protecting traditional Russian spiritual and moral values,” President Putin said,

“Traditional values are the moral guidelines that our forefathers have laid down over the centuries. They are the basis of our civilisation and identity, the pillar of life for individuals and families. They mould our culture, our sovereign world outlook, which is resistant to attempts to impose foreign will on us. Our fundamental values include the unity of the people of Russia, commitment to truth and justice, mercy and humanism, a strong family and love for our children, mutual assistance and a striving not only for personal well-being but also for the success of our country as a whole, as well as patriotism and devotion to our Motherland, of course” (Meeting, 2025, para 2).

Uncertainty Avoidance (UAI)



Figure 5. Hofstede's Uncertainty Avoidance Index scores for the U.S. and Russia. Adapted from Hofstede et al. (2010).

Uncertainty avoidance addresses the way individuals in a particular national culture handle uncertainty, and the degree to which that uncertainty causes anxiety (Hofstede et al., 2010). Hofstede et al. (2010) described uncertainty avoidance as “the extent to which the members of a culture feel threatened by ambiguous or unknown situations” (p. 191). Hofstede Insights (2022) described this dimension of national culture as follows:

The dimension Uncertainty Avoidance has to do with the way that a society deals with the fact that the future can never be known: should we try to control the future or just let it happen? This ambiguity brings with it anxiety and different cultures have learnt to deal with this anxiety in different ways. The extent to which the members of a culture feel threatened by ambiguous or unknown situations and have created beliefs and institutions that try to avoid these is reflected in the score on Uncertainty Avoidance.

Another aspect of Uncertainty Avoidance concerns the willingness to violate rules, such as the degree to which employees agree with the statement, “Company rules should not be broken – even when the employee thinks it is in the company’s best interest” (Hofstede et al., 2010, p. 190).

Hofstede et al. (2010) assessed that Russian national culture has a very high score (95) for uncertainty avoidance, suggesting that Russians prefer predictability over uncertainty, and the known over the unknown. This preference for predictability and avoidance of the unknown can be seen in the Russian workplace, where Wolf and Stankovic (2015) described how the “main role of numerous administrative workers... is to establish rules and formal procedures in order to provide a predictable and stable working environment where there is nothing left to random for an unpredicted change” (p. 10). Their study also revealed that “Russian management doesn’t accept changes gladly. They are especially skeptical toward decisions that haven’t been proved in practice” (Wolf and Stankovic, 2015, p. 10).

According to Hofstede (2001), citizens in countries with high uncertainty avoidance scores (like Russia) are less interested and active in politics than citizens in cultures where uncertainty is accepted (like the U.S.). In countries like Russia, “uncertainties create anxiety” (Küçükkömürlü & Özkan, 2022). “Better the devil you know, than the devil you don’t,” as the saying goes – a concept that resonates with citizens of a high uncertainty avoidance culture. Russia’s long history is replete with periods of calamity, with the chaotic years of the Yeltsin era being only the most recent instance (Robinson, 2000). Putin regime messaging about the threats to Russia posed by NATO, “Nazis” in Ukraine, and the unhappy days of the Yeltsin period repeatedly remind Russian citizens of the possible disasters that could face them in the absence of Vladimir Putin, the strong, virile, bare-chested leader on horseback (Malinova, 2021).

Putin has often described the post-Soviet 1990s as a time of “chaos” and “paralysis of power,” contrasting it with the stability provided by centralized authority—e.g., warning that “the paralysis of power and will is the first step towards complete degradation and oblivion” (Address, 2022, para 5).

Long-Term Orientation (LTO)

Long-term orientation (LTO), Hofstede et al.’s (2010) fifth dimension of national culture, concerns whether members of a culture delay gratification in exchange for rewards in the future (long-term orientation) or focus on achieving immediate rewards (short-term orientation). Russia (81) is a long-




Figure 6. Hofstede's Long Term Orientation Index scores for the U.S. and Russia. Adapted from Hofstede et al. (2010).

term oriented culture, while the U.S. (26) is a short-term oriented one. Bigge and Thoren (2016) characterized Russian national culture, with its relatively high LTO score of 81, as *pragmatic*: “Russia has a pragmatic mindset...Societies with pragmatic orientation, not only rely on the present situation, time and context but also on investing in modern education as well as future prospects. This makes the Russian society value thriftiness and perseverance” (p. 17). Hofstede et al. (2010) said LTO “stands for the fostering of virtues oriented toward future rewards—in particular, perseverance and thrift. Its opposite pole, short-term orientation, stands for the fostering of virtues related to the past and present—in particular, respect for tradition, preservation of ‘face,’ and fulfilling social obligations” (p. 239).

Long-term orientation describes how every society has to maintain some links with its own past while dealing with the challenges of the present and future, and societies prioritize these two existential goals differently (Hofstede et al., 2010). “Normative societies, which score low on this dimension, for example, prefer to maintain time-honored traditions and norms while viewing societal change with suspicion. Those with a culture which scores high, on the other hand, take a more pragmatic approach: they encourage thrift and efforts in modern education as a way to prepare for the future” (Hofstede Insights, 2022).

The linkage between the present and the past in a long-term oriented culture helps explain why Kremlin propaganda themes resonate with the Russian public, and why Putin talks about Ukraine in historical terms. On 12 July 2021, a lengthy essay attributed to Vladimir Putin appeared on the Kremlin’s website (Putin, 2022). In that essay, Putin made seven historically based assertions about Ukraine (Putin, 2022):

1. The Holodomor was simply a famine that impacted Russia and Ukraine equally
2. Ukraine’s 1991 borders were not legitimate
3. Crimea rightfully belongs to the Russian Federation because there was no legal basis for Nikita Krushchev to “gift” it to Ukraine in 1954
4. Ukraine “does not need” Donbas
5. NATO countries are turning Ukraine against Russia
6. The only way Ukraine can succeed in the future is in partnership with Russia
7. Creation of a Ukrainian state hostile to Russia “is comparable in its consequences to the use of weapons of mass destruction against us”

In 1999, three Russian journalists extensively interviewed Vladimir Putin before he first ran for election as President of the Russian Federation, meeting with him “on six separate occasions, for about four hours at a time” (Putin, 2000, p. ix). It was from these interviews, contained in the resultant book *First Person* (2000), that the world first became acquainted with Putin’s stories of hunting down and killing rats in his childhood apartment house (Putin, 2000). Even then, before he was ever elected President, Putin opined, “even when you are making suppositions, you have to think of the long term” (p. 176).

Indulgence versus Restraint (IVR)

According to Hofstede et al. (2010), the U.S. is very *Indulgent* (68), whereas Russia is considerably more *Restrained* (20).




Figure 7. Hofstede's Indulgence versus Restraint Index scores for the U.S. and Russia. Adapted from Hofstede et al. (2010).

As Hofstede et al. (2010) asserted, “More indulgent societies have more optimistic people, and vice versa” (p. 290). Even after the demise of the Soviet Union, and despite significant economic and quality-of-life improvements in Russia between 1998 and 2008, Hofstede et al. (2010) noted, “the dismally low happiness levels that characterized them at the outset of the period remained virtually unchanged a decade later” (p. 290). Hofstede et al. (2010) relate a story about the U.S. hamburger chain McDonald’s experience when it expanded its operations into Russia. Part of McDonald’s corporate culture is that its employees smile broadly at patrons, something the company trained its Russian employees to do. Unfortunately, broadly grinning employees are received with shock in the Russian culture. A similar distinction between Russian and American cultures is the lack of smiling in photographs. “Over in Russia, a stern face is a sign of seriousness, and it only seems to bolster the high rating that Vladimir Putin has always enjoyed” (Hofstede et al., 2010, p. 295). As Grossman, Ellsworth, and Hong (2012) asserted, “Americans may feel that they should say that they are happy, look happy, and act happy in order to show that they are successful members of their culture. Russians may emphasize darker emotions in order to look like good Russians. Any or all of these processes may contribute to cultural differences in emotion” (p. 5).

Another aspect of this dimension of national culture concerns the openness of a society. Whereas indulgent societies tolerate self-expression, more restrained cultures tend to be intolerant of behaviors that deviate from societal norms, and refrain from emotional outbursts (Hofstede et al., 2010). According to Hofstede et al. (2010), “Indulgence stands for a tendency to allow relatively free gratification of basic and natural human desires related to enjoying life and having fun. Its opposite pole, restraint, reflects a conviction that such gratification needs to be curbed and regulated by strict social norms” (p. 281). In addition, “Indulgence versus restraint shows the conflict between a need for freedom of speech versus a need for order” (Hofstede et al., 2010, p. 413).

This cultural dimension also touches on perceptions about life and work; in indulgent societies, individuals lend greater importance to leisure, work-life balance, and the value of friendships; they have a positive attitude, and are more optimistic (Hofstede et al., 2010). By contrast, individuals in more restrained cultures tend to place less value on leisure and work-life balance, are more pessimistic and cynical, and place less importance on having friends (Hofstede et al., 2010). Hofstede Insights (2022) described this dimension of national culture as follows:

One challenge that confronts humanity, now and in the past, is the degree to which small children are socialized. Without socialization we do not become “human”. This dimension is defined as the extent to which people try to control their desires and impulses, based on the way they were raised. Relatively weak control is called *Indulgence* and relatively strong control is called *Restraint*. Cultures can, therefore, be described as Indulgent or Restrained.

Sacrificing in the present to ensure a better future is consistent with Restrained cultures (Hofstede et al., 2010). One of the recurring themes in Kremlin propaganda has been how horrendous things were for Russia and its people during the Yeltsin years of the 1990s: Former Soviet elites became oligarchs who “were able to control the country’s politics with their mountains of cash” (Soric, 2022), the country was broke and the economy was in shambles, and corruption was rampant. The underlying message in this oft-repeated narrative could be stated as: *Support President Putin so we don’t have to relive that nightmare of the 1990s.*

“Freedom of speech is a prominent goal in an indulgent Western country, but in a restrained one it will be downplayed if there are other compelling choices to be made. No wonder that there is a vast majority in Russia approving autocrats in their government, whereas Dutch people insist in political freedom” (Burgold, 2014, p. 9).

In a 30 September 2022 speech at the Kremlin, Russian President Vladimir Putin codified this cultural dichotomy into Russian state ideology. Criticizing the geopolitical hegemony of Western nations, Putin framed Western societal evolution not as progress, but as a crisis of unchecked indulgence:

"The dictatorship of the Western elites is directed against all societies, including the Western peoples themselves. This is a complete denial of humanity, the overthrow of faith and traditional values. Indeed, the suppression of freedom itself has taken on the features of a religion: outright Satanism. ...They move toward the abandonment of moral norms, traditional values, and religious beliefs" (Signing of treaties, 2022, para 30).

How history impacts national culture

According to Hofstede et al. (2010), two of the major determinants of national culture are history and geography. Each played very different roles in the shaping of U.S. and Russian national culture. In stark contrast to the United States, which benefited from relatively benign neighbors to its north and south and was protected from foreign invasion by the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, Russia has repeatedly suffered from its lack of natural barriers to invasion. In its 1,160 years of history, Russia has suffered from a succession of calamitous invasions, first by the Mongols (Vogel, 2002), then by the Poles and Lithuanians in 1610 (Tkachenko, 2020), then the Swedes in 1708 (Hollander, 2009) then by Napoleon in 1812, and finally by Nazi Germany in 1941. The Mongol invasion alone resulted in 400 years of Mongol subjugation (Halperin, 1983). In 2005, Vladimir Putin’s Russia designated 4 November as National Unity Day, a public holiday, to commemorate Russia’s liberation from Polish-Lithuanian occupation in 1612, which also ended the calamitous period in Russia known as the Time of Troubles (Tkachenko, 2020). Hitler’s invasion of the former Soviet Union not only resulted in four years of unprecedented death and destruction, but remains a traumatic, living memory for those who experienced it (Garrard, 1995).

History, leadership, and national culture

Russians have long been socialized to believe that Russian leaders who were perceived to be weak resulted in major calamities for the country, and that “it takes a leader with a strong hand to solve the problems of a country” (Chiozza & Stoyanov, p. 419). Older Russians vividly remember the decade of the 1990s, when post-Soviet Russia was led by the debilitated alcoholic Boris Yeltsin, a time when Russia suffered from hyperinflation, social hardships, rampant crime, the rise of the oligarchs, mafia violence, and Russia’s loss of global standing and influence (Robinson, 2022). In 1996, while serving as a newly-appointed, mid-level government functionary under then-Russian President Boris Yeltsin, Vladimir Putin presciently said, “It seems to us... that if a firm hand were to restore order, we would all live a better, cleaner, and safer life. In reality, this comfort would quickly vanish because this firm hand would very soon begin to strangle us” (YouTube, 2022). It was under Vladimir Putin, that Josef Stalin was rehabilitated and publicly extolled for having been the strong, successful leader who overcame huge losses and successfully defeated the Nazis in 1945 (Garner, 2025). “The cult of Stalin is therefore deeply linked to the Putinist cult of war, which has become so fervent with its catechesis, parades, holidays and temples that it functions like an official state religion” (Garner, 2025, para 6).

LIMITATIONS

Although Hofstede's Six Dimensions of National Culture framework is useful, it is not without its critics and shortcomings. For example, both Schwarz (1994) and McSweeney (2002) criticized Hofstede’s globally collected data for being based on just one corporation, IBM. Indeed, the basis for Hofstede’s characterizations of different national cultures was based on surveys he conducted exclusively with IBM staff around the world (Shaiq et al., 2011). It is hard to imagine that national culture in any country has remained static since 1978, leading Skrefsrud (2021) to assert that Hofstede’s framework was “static and deterministic” (p. 81). Al Mutairi et al. (2018) identified six different shortcomings in Hofstede’s theoretical approach, “the ecological fallacy, the concept of nations as units, the complexity of culture, the construct’s conceptualization, the research approach, and the dangers of stereotyping” (p. 759).

This study was an admittedly preliminary look at how U.S. and Russian national cultures differ, and how recognizing and appreciating these cultural differences can help us better understand why an increasingly authoritarian Vladimir Putin, and Putin’s war on Ukraine, continue to be viewed positively by a majority of Russian citizens but negatively by most Americans. Another limitation was that research was limited to English-language sources or English translations of Russian-language source materials. Finally, the true degree of support for Putin, and for Russia’s war in Ukraine, remains difficult to accurately determine, in part, because Russian citizens face swift and severe legal consequences for speaking negatively against the Putin regime or the war in Ukraine. A final limitation is that while relevant quotations from Vladimir Putin were provided to illustrate how Putin’s statements aligned with each of Hofstede et al.’s (2010) six indices, additional research based on empirical research would be required to raise analytic confidence in this alignment.

FINDINGS

Viewed through the prism of national culture, which Hofstede et al. (2010) assert is influenced by such factors as history and geography, the willingness of Russian citizens to approve of Vladimir Putin and support Russia’s war on Ukraine becomes more comprehensible. Influenced by a considerably different national culture, history, and geography, it is also more understandable why Americans view Vladimir Putin and Russia’s war on Ukraine very differently than do Russians. Despite its acknowledged

shortcomings, Hofstede et al.'s (2010) Six Dimensions of National Culture proves useful in identifying and highlighting some plausible reasons for these divergent interpretations.

IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

Future research on examining divergent attitudes based on national culture differences would benefit from acquiring survey data of Russian citizens not only inside Russia, but also of Russians in the diaspora community who grew up and were socialized in Russia but who have since left the country and now live abroad, where they may feel less constrained by concerns about the repercussions of expressing sentiments contrary to the Russian government's official positions. Conducting survey research with other countries (such as the Peoples Republic of China) would be beneficial for comparative analysis. Finally, it would be useful to conduct longitudinal studies on the evolution of political attitudes and culture in whichever country is studied.

REFERENCES

- Address by the President of the Russian Federation. (2022, February 24). *President of Russia*, <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/67843>
- Al Mutairi, S., Yen, D., & Heller, M. (2018). The many facets of national culture: A critical appraisal. *Comparative Sociology*, 17(6), 759-781.
- Baker, W. D., & O'Neal, J. R. (2001). Patriotism or opinion leadership? The nature and origins of the "rally 'round the flag" effect. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 45(5), 661-687.
- Bigge, V., and Thoren, M. (2016). *One hand washes the other: A multiple Case Study about the mystery of blat and how it influences Swedish companies in Russia*. Stockholm, Sweden: Linnaeus University.
- Bouza, K. (2022, May 11). Pussy Riot's Maria Alyokhina escaped Moscow dressed as a food courier. *Rolling Stone*. Retrieved from: <https://www.rollingstone.com/culture/culture-news/pussy-riot-maria-alyokhina-moscov-russia-escape-1351601/>
- Bowman, K. (2022, February 24). "Rally 'round Putin's flag?" *AEI*. Retrieved from: <https://www.aei.org/politics-and-public-opinion/rally-round-putins-flag/>
- Boyte, K. J. (2017). An analysis of the social-media technology, tactics, and narratives used to control perception in the propaganda war over Ukraine. *Journal of Information Warfare*, 16(1), 88-111.
- Buckley, N., Marquardt, K. L., Reuter, O. J., and Tertychnaya, K. (2002, April 13) "How popular is Putin, really?" *The Washington Post*. Retrieved from: <https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2022/04/13/putin-public-opinion-propaganda-levada-center/>
- Burgold, J. (2014). *A discussion of Geert Hofstede's most recently discovered cultural dimensions, long-term orientation (LTO) and indulgence versus restraint (IVR)*. AKAD University, Stuttgart, Germany.
- Burrett, Tina. (2020). Charting Putin's shifting populism in the Russian media from 2000 to 2020, *Politics and Governance*, 8(1), 193-205.
- Chernobrov, D., & Briant, E. L. (2022). Competing propagandas: How the United States and Russia represent mutual propaganda activities. *Politics*, 42(3), 393-409.
- Chiozza, G., & Stoyanov, D. (2018). The myth of the strong leader in Russian public opinion. *Problems of Post-Communism*, 65(6), 419-433.
- Dawisha, K. (2015). *Putin's kleptocracy: Who owns Russia?* Simon and Schuster.
- Do you approve of the activities of Vladimir Putin as the president (prime minister) of Russia? (2026, April). *Statista*, Retrived from: https://www.statista.com/statistics/896181/putin-approval-rating-russia/?srsltid=AfmBOoob2Lqp_vdLjQMFBWcmpeQ0ID35NJ_CqOtIFkBUM0xcskH5Ui9N
- Dollbaum, J. M., Lallouet, M., and Noble, B. (2021). *Navalny: Putin's nemesis, Russia's future?* Oxford University Press.
- Dzero, I., & Bystrova, T. (2017). Pussy Riot and the translatability of cultures. *Transcultural Studies*, 13(2), 264-286.
- Eckel, M. (2026, May 27). Nearly 500,000 Russian soldiers killed in Ukraine since start of all-out war, British Intelligence says. *Reuters*. Retrieved from: <https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-ukraine-war-casualties-british-intelligence/33766873.html>
- Eidelman, T. (2013). Navalny's near miss. *Russian Life*, 56(6), 64-65.
- Etkind, A. (2021). The art of Navalny and the history of corruption. *Current History*, 120(828), 287-289.
- Frye, T., Gehlbach, S., Marquardt, K. L. & Reuter, O. J. (2017). Is Putin's popularity real?" *Post-Soviet Affairs*, 33(1), 1-15. doi:10.1080/1060586X.2016.1144334
- Gaddy, C. G., & Ickes, B. W. (2009). Putin's third way. *The National Interest*, (99), 45-52.
- Galeotti, M. (2023). *Putin takes Crimea 2014*. London: Bloomsbury Publishing.
- Garner, I. (2025, May 21). Stalin is making a comeback in Russia. Here's why. *The Moscow Times*. Retrieved from: <https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2025/05/21/stalin-is-making-a-comeback-in-russia-heres-why-a89155>
- Garrard, J. (1995). The Nazi Holocaust in the Soviet Union: Interpreting newly opened Russian archives. *East European Jewish Affairs*. 25(2), 3-40.
- Grachev, M. V., & Bobina, M. A. (2006). Russian organizational leadership: Lessons from the GLOBE study. *International Journal of leadership studies*, 1(2), 67-79.
- Greene, S. A., & Robertson, G. (2022). Affect and autocracy: Emotions and attitudes in Russia after Crimea. *Perspectives on Politics*, 20(1), 38-52.
- Grossmann, I., Ellsworth, P. C., & Hong, Y. Y. (2012). Culture, attention, and emotion. *Journal of Experimental Psychology*, 141(1), 1-6.
- Hale, H. E. (2011). The myth of mass Russian support for autocracy: The public opinion foundations of a hybrid regime. *Europe-Asia Studies*, 63(8), 1357-1375. doi.org
- Halperin, C. J. (1983). Russia in the Mongol empire in comparative perspective. *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*, 43(1), 239-261.

- Hear what Vladimir Putin said in 1996 about Russia turning to totalitarianism. (2022, March 7). *YouTube*. Retrieved from: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=g0bvDsJMzGA&t=27s>
- Hofstede, G. (1980). *Culture's consequences*. London: Sage.
- Hofstede, G. & Hofstede, G. J. & Minkov, M. (2010). *Cultures and organizations: Software of the mind*. New York: McGraw-Hill.
- Hofstede Insights. (2022). *Hofstede-insights.com*. Retrieved from: <https://www.hofstede-insights.com/fi/product/compare-countries/>
- Hollander, S. (2009). *Chaos and Cossacks, two fatal vendettas: the invasions of Russia in 1708 and 1812*. Doctoral dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
- House, R. J., Hanges, P. J., Javidan, M., Dorfman, P. W., & Gupta, V. (Eds.). (2004). *Culture, leadership, and organizations: The GLOBE study of 62 societies*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage publications.
- Hosoe, N. (2023). The cost of war: Impact of sanctions on Russia following the invasion of Ukraine. *Journal of Policy Modeling*, 45(2), 305-319.
- Humphrey, C. (2001). Inequality and exclusion: a Russian case study of emotion in politics. *Anthropological Theory*, 1(3), 331-353.
- Javakhishvili, E. (2020). War, censorship, and public opinion in Russia: Putin's struggle at home and abroad. *Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies*, 180, 1-17.
- Jones, S. G., and McCabe, R. (2026, January 27). Russia's grinding war in Ukraine. *Center for Strategic & International Studies*. Retrieved from: <https://www.csis.org/analysis/russias-grinding-war-ukraine>
- Kizilova, K., and Norris, P. (2022a). Assessing Russian public opinion on the Ukraine war. *Russian Analytical Digest*, 180, 2-25.
- Kizilova, K., & Norris, P. (2022b). What do ordinary Russians really think about the war in Ukraine? *Political Regime Stability/Universities/Agriculture*, 29(281), 2-7.
- Küçükkömürlü, S., & Özkan, T. (2022). Political interest across cultures: The role of uncertainty avoidance and trust. *International Journal of Intercultural Relations*, 91, 88-96.
- Kuzio, T. (2022). Imperial nationalism as the driver behind Russia's invasion of Ukraine. *Nations and Nationalism*. Retrieved from: <https://doi.org/10.1111/nana.12875>
- Khvostunova, O. (2022). Do Russians really "long for war" in Ukraine? *Foreign Policy Research Institute*. Retrieved from: <https://policycommons.net/artifacts/2298068/do-russians-really-long-for-war-in-ukraine/3058515/>
- Kizilova, K., & Norris, P. (2022b). What do ordinary Russians really think about the war in Ukraine? *Political Regime Stability/Universities/Agriculture*, 29(281), 2-7.
- Kortukov, D., and Waller, J. G. (2024). The foundations of Russian statehood. *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, 2, 1-27.
- Kurpyaeva, O., and Latukhina, K. (2013, June 12). Putin explained what is preventing a "reset" in Russia-US relations. *RGRU*. Retrieved from: <https://www.rg.ru/2013/06/12/perezagruzka-site.html>
- Linchenko, A., & Golovashina, O. (2019). "With tears upon our eyes?": Commemorations of Victory Day in the Great Patriotic War in the school practice in the Soviet Union and Russia. *Journal of Social Science Education*, 18(1), 56-80.
- Lyness, K. S., & Grotto, A. R. (2018). Women and leadership in the United States: Are we closing the gender gap? *Annual Review of Organizational Psychology and Organizational Behavior*, 5, 227-265.
- Malinova, O. (2021). Framing the collective memory of the 1990s as a legitimization tool for Putin's regime. *Problems of Post-Communism*, 68(5), 429-441.
- McSweeney, B. 2002a. "Hofstede's model of national cultural differences and their consequences: A triumph of faith-a failure of analysis." *Human relations*, 55(1), 89-118.
- Meeting of the Security Council. (2025, June 10). *President of Russia*. Retrieved from: http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/77160?fbclid=IwY2xjawSFFVNleHRuA2FlbQlXMAbicmlkETeZQTdmRG1tS2RHZjI0Q1NBc3J0YwZhcHBfaWQQMjlyMDM5MTc4ODIwMDg5MgABHjzaaV6CnP3aVpqWPP3qXVB3taqWwfSUo2eBroNIFaRZ8dAteKwkMGLxI8je_aem_DZmXCTdb46ZaumHX3dVjAA
- Mueller, John. (2022, September-October). Russian public opinion and the Ukraine war: Applying the American experience. *Military Review*, 28-36.
- On approval of the fundamentals of state policy for the preservation and strengthening of traditional Russian spiritual and moral values. (2022, November 9). Decree number 809 of the President of the Russian Federation. Retrieved from: <https://india-new-delhi.rs.gov.ru/app/uploads/2024/05/decreed-of-the-president-of-the-russian-federation-of-november-9-2022-no.-809-1.pdf>
- Pagen, J. (2020). A new Russian realpolitik: Putin's operationalization of psychology and propaganda. *Global Security & Intelligence Studies*, 5(1), 55-80.

- Parker, C. (2022, March 8). 58 percent of Russians support the invasion of Ukraine, and 23 percent oppose it, new poll shows. *The Washington Post*. Retrieved from: <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/03/08/russia-public-opinion-ukraine-invasion/>
- Pertsev, A. (2024, January 3). Carrots and sticks to promote collectivism. *Riddle*. Retrieved from: <https://ridl.io/carrots-and-sticks-to-promote-collectivism/>
- Poll shows Putin ratings climb among Russians since Ukraine invasion. (2022, April 1). *RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty*. Retrieved from: <https://www.rferl.org/a/putin-poll-ratings-climb/31781913.html>
- Putin, V. (1999). *First Person*. New York: Public Affairs
- Putin, V. (2022, July 12). On the historical unity of Russians and Ukrainians. *Kremlin.ru*. Retrieved from: <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/page/62>
- Riehle, K. P. (2024). Riehle, K. P. (2024). Ignorance, indifference, or incompetence: Why are Russian covert actions so easily unmasked? *Intelligence and National Security*, 39(5), 864-878
- Riehle, K. P. (2022). Information power and Russia's national security objectives. *The Journal of Intelligence, Conflict, and Warfare*, 4(3), 62-83.
- Robinson, N. (2000). The presidency: the politics of institutional chaos. In *Institutions and political change in Russia* (pp. 11-40). Palgrave Macmillan, London.
- Robinson, P. (2022, August 8). The strange death of liberal Russia, part II. *Russia.Post*. Retrieved from: https://russiapost.info/society/death_of_liberal_russia_p2
- Russia: Arrests, harassment of Ukraine war dissidents. (2022, March 24). *Human Rights Watch*. Retrieved from: <https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/03/24/russia-arrests-harassment-ukraine-war-dissidents>
- Russia between the millenia. (2025). (in Russian). Retrieved from: https://www.ng.ru/politics/1999-12-30/4_millennium.html
- Rustamova, F., and Tovkaylo, M. (2022, December 9). What secret Russian state polling tells us about support for the war. *Moscow Times*. Retrieved from: <https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2022/12/06/what-secret-russian-state-polling-tells-us-about-support-for-the-war-a79596>
- Schreck, C. (2022, April 7). Russians detained for holding up 'invisible placards'. *RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty*. Retrieved from: <https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-protest-arrests/25324619.html>
- Schwartz, S. H. 1994. "Are there universal aspects in the structure and contents of human values?" *Journal of Social Issues*, 50(4), 19-45.
- Shaiq, H. M. A., Khalid, H. M. S., Akram, A., & Ali, B. (2011). Why not everybody loves Hofstede? What are the alternative approaches to study of culture. *European Journal of Business and Management*, 3(6), 101-111.
- Sharafutdinova, G. (2022). Public opinion formation and group identity: The politics of national identity salience in post-Crimea Russia. *Problems of Post-Communism*, 69(3), 219-231.
- Signing of treaties on accession of Donetsk and Lugansk people's republics and Zaporozhye and Kherson regions to Russia. (2022, September 30). *President of Russia*. Retrieved from: <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/69465>
- Skrefsrud, T. A. (2021). A transcultural approach to cross-cultural studies: Towards an alternative to a national culture model. *The Journal of Transcultural Studies*, 12(1), 81-100.
- Snegovaya, M. (2023). Why Russia's Democracy Never Began. *Journal of Democracy*, 34(3), 105-118.
- Soric, Miodrag. (2022, October 10). Why don't Russians demonstrate for democracy? *Deutsche Welle*. Retrieved from: <https://www.dw.com/en/opinion-why-dont-russians-demonstrate-for-freedom-and-democracy/a-63381680>
- Tkachenko, V. (2020). From the Time of Troubles to the Unity Day: Memory, forgetting and re-imaging the past in Russian History. *University of Bucharest Review. Literary and Cultural Studies Series*, 10(1), 85-98.
- Treisman, Rachel. (2022, April 18). What Russians think of the war in Ukraine, according to an independent pollster. *National Public Radio*. Retrieved from: <https://www.npr.org/2022/04/18/1093282038/russia-war-public-opinion-polling>
- Vachedin, D. (2017, March 14). Levada Center designated a foreign agent (Леваду-центр' оставили 'иностранным агентом) *Deutsche Welle*. Retrieved from: <https://www.dw.com/en/russian-ngo-memorial-to-fight-foreign-agent-label-in-russia/a-35965436>
- Vogel, M. (2002). The Mongol connection: Mongol influences on the development of Moscow. *IU South Bend Undergraduate Research Journal*, 5, 93-96.
- Volkov, D. (2015, July 23). How authentic is Putin's approval rating? *Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center*. Retrieved from: <https://carnegie.ru/commentary/60849>
- Walker, T. F. (2022, April 6). The collectivist roots of Russian atrocities. *The Objective Standard*. Retrieved from: https://www.theobjectivestandard.com/p/the-collectivist-roots-of-russian-atrocities?has_completed_unsubscribed_unlock=true
- Wolf, K. J., & Stankovic, M. J. (2015) How does a Swiss watch run in Russia? *Eco-worldwide.com*.

Yaffa, Joshua. (2022, March 29). Why do so many Russians say they support the war in Ukraine? *The New Yorker*. Retrieved from: <https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/why-do-so-many-russians-say-they-support-the-war-in-ukraine>